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Since 2005, the Bankruptcy Code has limited Chapter 7 debtors to 
two asset retention options, reaffirmation and redemption. This 
Note explores the impact of the modified asset retention options 
both on the incentives of debtors and creditors during bankruptcy 
proceedings and on the deals they reach in practice. 
 
While the 2005 revisions succeeded in eliminating an irksome 
circuit split, this Note illustrates the way in which they fostered 
deeper problems with asset retention. It argues that allowing ride-
through – the option laid to rest in 2005 – would better achieve the 
bankruptcy goals of protecting debtors and creditors while 
promoting doctrinal uniformity. 
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On August 11, 2011, Carolyn Denise Bowden filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 
North Carolina.1 Prior to filing, Bowden had been making regular payments on a 2006 Chevrolet 
Trailblazer.2 When she filed her bankruptcy petition, Bowden owed $4,534.31 on the Trailblazer 
to her creditor, Ally Financial.3 By filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Bowden successfully discharged 
unsecured obligations, including credit card debt. But Ally Financial still had a set of ownership 
rights with respect to the Trailblazer, which secured Bowden’s outstanding $4,534.31 loan. For 
Bowden and Ally Financial, the treatment of the outstanding $4,534.31 debt on the Trailblazer 
presented a key procedural inquiry in the bankruptcy process, determining who would retain the 
vehicle and how retention costs would be allocated. 
Bowden’s vehicle retention dilemma is a recurrent procedural step for which consumer 
bankruptcy law should have a ready reply. But the treatment of secured debt in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy is both uncertain and opaque. Three options have been uniformly available to 
Chapter 7 debtors for decades. Under section 521(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”), 
Bowden could surrender the Trailblazer to Ally Financial to satisfy her outstanding debt. 
Alternatively, Bowden could redeem the Trailblazer by paying Ally Financial the full value of 
the Trailblazer within thirty days following the petition. Finally, Bowden could reaffirm the debt, 
agreeing to a new post-bankruptcy repayment schedule and renewing personal liability for the 
vehicle. All of these options, unfortunately, present significant drawbacks for Chapter 7 debtors. 
                                                 
1  In re Bowden, No. 11-06168-8-SWH, 2012 WL 589657, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2012). 
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
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Beyond the three statutory options lies a potential fourth, which is the primary focus of 
this Note. In addition to surrender, redemption, and reaffirmation, a debtor may in certain 
circumstances retain the asset simply by continuing to make regular payments according to the 
pre-bankruptcy loan schedule, or ride-through the asset. This Note distinguishes between three 
types of ride-through. Beginning in the 1990s, courts divided on whether a Chapter 7 debtor 
could retain an asset by common-law ride-through, based on judicial interpretation of the 
relevant Code provisions. By the time Congress reacted in 2005, common-law ride-through was 
expressly accepted in five circuits and rejected in five others.4 
In 2005, acting under a congressional mandate to create uniform bankruptcy laws,5 
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).6 
Courts initially struggled to interpret the amendments, but eventually reached a consensus that 
BAPCPA eliminated common-law ride-through. Yet it soon became clear that ride-through was 
not entirely defunct. Increasingly, courts construed the BAPCPA amendments to continue the 
automatic stay, and so prevent a creditor from repossessing, as long as the debtor attempted to 
either redeem, reaffirm, or surrender. In this way, if a reaffirmation agreement were rejected, a 
debtor could nonetheless retain the asset, achieving a second form of backdoor ride-through. 
This Note shows how BAPCPA, while resolving the circuit split on common-law ride-
through, aggravated other problems with Chapter 7 asset retention; and argues that replacing 
reaffirmation with statutory ride-through would cure the doctrinal defects. Part I first explores 
                                                 
4  The Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits allowed debtors to elect ride-through. See infra notes 
23-25, 30. The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits did not. See infra notes 27-29, 32. 
5  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
6 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).  
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the history and effect of the BAPCPA amendments by comparing the treatment of motor vehicle 
debt for Delaware debtors filing before and after 2005. Part II uses a simple game-theory 
framework to show why so many debtors and creditors avoid all three post-BAPCPA statutory 
options, instead reaching agreements entirely outside the scope of section 521(a)(6). In addition 
to backdoor ride-through, creditors and debtors enter informal forbearance agreements or 
Chapter 7 debtors may convert to Chapter 13. 
To this descriptive analysis, Part III adds a normative overlay, arguing that the current 
system fails to protect both debtors and creditors while fostering uncertainty in the application of 
law. Many pre-BAPCPA commentators noted that reaffirmation agreements violate the fresh 
start policy of Chapter 7. Following BAPCPA, backdoor ride-through exposes secured creditors 
to unanticipated risk. Part IV, finally, argues that statutory ride-through, supplemented by a 
reinstate-and-cure provision, would create uniformity in consumer bankruptcy law while better 
serving the interests of debtors and their secured creditors. From a practical perspective, the 
emerging acceptance of backdoor ride-through could encourage pro-creditor Congress to 
formally adopt its statutory sibling. 
On an aggregate scale, the significance of the procedural uncertainty facing debtors and 
secured creditors like Bowden and Ally Financial is enormous. In 2010, 1,129,955 individuals 
filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions, bringing $273 billion of debt into bankruptcy proceedings.7 
                                                 
7 U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES REPORTED BY INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS IN CHAPTER 7 
CASES WITH PREDOMINANTLY NONBUSINESS DEBTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx 
(follow “Calendar Year 2010” hyperlink under “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
Statistics”; then follow “Table 1A” hyperlink) [hereinafter “CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR STATISTICS 2010”]. 
Collective assets of $235 billion offset the $273 billion debt. Id. The total assets include a debtor who 
reported nearly $100 billion in assets. When the outlier is removed from the sample, the total assets shrink to $136 
billion, less than the total amount of secured debt. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STAT. DIVISION, 2010 REPORT OF 
STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 10, 
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Of the total debt, more than half – $148 billion – was secured, requiring treatment under section 
521(a)(6).8 This Note shows how, as asset retention options have splintered and Chapter 7 
petitions continue to expand,9 the need for reform of this Code section is more pressing than 
ever. Adopting statutory ride-through would alleviate many of the current problems with the 
Code’s treatment of secured debt in consumer bankruptcy. 
I. A TALE OF TWO DEBTORS 
For Michael and Christine Price and Kimberly Miller, “it was the worst of times.”10 Like 
Carolyn Bowden, both debtors – Michael and Christine Price filing jointly11 and Kimberly Miller 
individually – sought to cure their insolvency by filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions. Both 
debtors filed in Delaware. Both hoped to retain their motor vehicles, encumbered by creditor 
liens, after emerging from bankruptcy. But the Prices filed their petition in 2001, and Miller filed 
hers in 2010. During the intervening decade, BAPCPA had taken effect. 
                                                                                                                                                             
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (follow “Calendar Year 2010” hyperlink 
under “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act Statistics”; then follow “Full Report” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY REPORT 2010]. 
8  CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR STATISTICS 2010, supra note 7. To put the figure in perspective, the $148 billion of 
secured debt equaled over one-half the value of all new car sales and one percent of national gross domestic product 
during the same year. BUR. OF TRANSPORTATION STAT., TABLE 1-17 NEW & USED PASSENGER CAR SALES & 
LEASES, available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_17.html 
(listing total new vehicle sales in 2010 as $311 billion); U.S. DEP’T. OF COMM., BUR. ECON. ANAL., TABLE 1.1.5 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, available at http://bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 (follow “Table 1.1.5. 
Gross Domestic Product (A) (Q)” hyperlink under “Section 1 – Domestic Product and Income”) (listing U.S. GDP 
as $14.8 trillion over the year ended December 2010). 
9  In the year ended September 2011, the number of Chapter 7 petitions increased to 1,467,221. U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS, BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, 
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2011, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (follow “12-month period ending September” under 
“Filings”; then follow “2011 September xls” hyperlink). 
10 CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 1 (A.C. McClurg & Co., 1888) (1859). 
11 Because the couple filed jointly, they are treated as an individual debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 
U.S.C. § 302. The Code provisions that refer to “Debtor” refer to both Michael and Christine Price. 
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Based on the BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the Price and Miller courts 
reached opposite conclusions on whether a debtor could elect to ride-through an asset in 
bankruptcy. This section illustrates the way in which BAPCPA modified debtors’ post-
bankruptcy collateral retention options and the textual basis for the Delaware court’s reversal on 
the issue of common-law ride-through. It then situates Delaware in a national context, describing 
how the pre-BAPCPA circuit split gave way to a universal extinction of common-law ride-
through following BAPCPA. 
A. In re Price: Ride-Through before BAPCPA 
On December 11, 2001, Michael and Christine Price filed a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition.12 The Chapter 7 fresh start policy13 allowed the Prices discharged their unsecured debts 
in exchange for forfeiting non-exempt assets.14 For debt secured by personal property, however, 
Code section 521(2) required that the Prices 
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a 
petition under chapter 7 . . . file with the clerk a statement 
of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of 
such property and, if applicable, specifying that such 
property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to 
redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm 
debts secured by such property; and 
(B) within 30 days after the first date set for the meeting of 
creditors . . . perform his intention . . .; 
                                                 
12 In re Price, 281 B.R. 240, 240 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002), subsequently rev’d, 370 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2004). The 
factual summary is based on the Bankruptcy Court opinion, while the legal analysis comes from the Third Circuit 
reversal. 
13 For further discussion of the fresh start and its policy rationale, see infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
14 A Chapter 7 debtor may take advantage of both state and federal exemptions to retain assets post-discharge. 
The federal exemptions, set in 2010 and subject to periodic adjustments, allow debtors to retain $21,625 in real 
property, $3,450 in one motor vehicle, and $1,450 in jewelry. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (adjustments under 11 U.S.C. § 
104). For a list of personal and homestead exemptions under state law in 2000, see Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre 
Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 376-77 (2009). 
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except that nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph 
shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such 
property under this title.15 
Earlier in 2001, the Prices had secured a loan for $21,985.29 from the Delaware State 
Police Federal Credit Union with their Toyota Corolla and Sienna.16 Because the debt was 
secured by personal property, section 521(2)(A) required the Prices to file a statement of 
intention indicating whether they would redeem, surrender, or reaffirm the debt in bankruptcy. 
Section 521(2)(B) required them to promptly follow through with their intended action. 
 For the Prices, the three options looked dismal. They could not afford to redeem their 
vehicles under section 722, which required them to pay the Credit Union a lump sum equal to the 
liquidation value of the Corolla and Sienna.17 The Prices could alternatively satisfy their debt by 
surrendering the vehicles to the Credit Union, but would then emerge from bankruptcy without a 
vehicle.18 The third and final option was to reaffirm the debt under section 524. To reaffirm, the 
Prices had to enter a formal agreement with the Credit Union, promising to repay the outstanding 
loan according to a revised post-bankruptcy schedule.19 If they reaffirmed, the Prices could retain 
                                                 
15 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). 
16 In re Price, 281 B.R. at 240. 
17 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2000). In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court in Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash ruled that 
the appropriate valuation standard for a Chapter 13 cramdown was “replacement value” of the asset. 520 U.S. 953, 
956. Although some courts applied the replacement value standard for Chapter 7 debtors as well, the Delaware 
Bankruptcy Court never adopted the standard. Other Third Circuit bankruptcy courts continued to use liquidation 
value in Chapter 7 cases. In re Basher, 291 B.R. 357, 364 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that “a Chapter 7 case . 
. . would not implicate application of the Rash replacement value test in a cramdown context”). When the Prices 
filed, liquidation value was required to redeem. 
For further discussion of the infeasibility of redemption, see infra Part II(B)(ii). 
18 The majority of debtors are reluctant to surrender their vehicles. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. 
White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 739 (1999) 
[hereinafter Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge] (finding that in 1995, seventy-nine percent of Chapter 7 car-
owners intended to retain their encumbered vehicles following bankruptcy). For further discussion of the disutility 
of surrender, see infra Part II(B)(i). 
19 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000). 
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the vehicles, but if they failed to make a scheduled payment, the Credit Union could repossess.20 
In that case, if the Credit Union sold the vehicles for less than the debt they secured, the Prices 
would be personally liable for the deficiency. Because motor vehicles are typically worth less 
than the debt they secure,21 if the Prices defaulted after reaffirming, they would likely find 
themselves without a car and nonetheless mired in debt. 
The options available under section 521(2)(A) left the Prices between a rock and a hard 
place. So when they filed their statement of intention, the Prices neglected to select redemption, 
surrender, or reaffirmation. Instead, the Prices indicated that they would simply “retain [the] 
collateral and continue to make regular payments,”22 or ride-through the vehicles in bankruptcy. 
The Prices rested this election in bedrock of judicial authority from other circuits. The Second, 
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had construed section 521(2)(A) to allow a debtor who is 
current on loan payments to retain an asset without redeeming or reaffirming.23 The Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits reasoned that the plain language of section 521(2)(A) permitted ride-through, 
because the phrase “if applicable” indicated that a debtor was not limited to the options given by 
statute.24 The Second and Tenth Circuits focused on the function of the statute and its 
                                                 
20 Outside of bankruptcy, secured creditors have the right to repossess collateral following an event of default. 
See U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(1) (2000); infra note 138. 
21 In 1995, an auto industry executive stated that new car lenders creditors were undersecured by an average 
of $4,000 at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy. See Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 
741-42 (citing confidential conversation between Elizabeth Warren and industry executive). 
22 In re Price, 281 B.R. at 240-41. 
23 In re Price, 281 B.R. at 242 (citing McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668, 
673 (9th Cir. 1998); Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 
1992); Capital Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997); Lowry 
Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
24 In re Parker, 139 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he only mandatory act is the filing of the statement of intention . . . Then, 
‘if applicable,’ – that is, if the debtor plans to choose any of the three options listed later in the statute . . .”); In re 
Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348 (“The phrase ‘if applicable’ is redundant if . . . the options given to the debtor are 
considered to be exclusive.”). 
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enforcement mechanisms to reach the same conclusion.25 In any of these four circuits, the Prices 
could have elected common-law ride-through. 
 The Credit Union protested. Against the weight of four permissive circuits, the Credit 
Union cited decisions by the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits that explicitly rejected 
common-law ride-through.26 Citing the same statutory text, these four circuit interpreted the “if 
applicable” language to require a debtor to specify one of the three options if retention was 
applicable; in other words, if the debtor intended to retain the asset post-bankruptcy.27 The four 
rejecting circuits also advanced competing policy arguments, worrying that that no debtor would 
reaffirm if ride-through were available,28 and that ride-through would increase credit rates and 
expose creditors to undue risk.29 Following this logic, the Credit Union argued that because the 
Prices hoped to retain the vehicles, they were limited to the three statutory options. 
 Facing a fifty-fifty circuit split, the Prices flipped a lucky coin. The Third Circuit joined 
the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in permitting common-law ride-through, reversing 
                                                 
25 In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51 (finding that “§ 521(2) appears to serve primarily a notice function, not 
necessarily to restrict the substantive options available to a debtor who wishes to retain collateral securing a debt”); 
Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d at 1547 (“[A]lthough we regard as mandatory the provisions of [§ 521], we do 
not believe those provisions make redemption or reaffirmation the exclusive means by which a bankruptcy court can 
allow a debtor to retain secured property.”). 
26 In re Price, 281 B.R. at 244. 
27 Bank of Boston v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843, 847 (1st Cir.1998); Johnson v. Sun Fin. Co. (In re 
Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir.1996); Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 
(11th Cir.1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir.1990). See also Ned W. Waxman, Redemption or 
Reaffirmation: The Debtor’s Exclusive Means of Retaining Possession of Collateral in Chapter 7, U. PITT. L. REV. 
187, 196-97 (1994) (“Where, then, is the remedy of retention authorized in the Code? Nowhere!”). 
28 In re Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386 (noting that “[n]o debtor would reaffirm personal liability unless required 
to do so”); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516 (comparing ride-through to a “de facto reaffirmation agreement” in which a 
creditor has “no recourse against the debtor”). The Ninth Circuit put the point more strongly, “If ride-through 
existed, any lawyer who advised his client to make a reaffirmation offer on the original contract terms would be 
guilty of malpractice . . . [Why] incur the risk of personal liability when one could safely achieve the same ends by 
ride-through?” In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114. 
29 E.g., In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516 (“Allowing a debtor to retain collateral without reaffirming or redeeming 
gives the debtor . . . a ‘head start’ since the debtor effectively converts his secured obligation from recourse to 
nonrecourse with no downside risk for failing to maintain or insure the lender's collateral.”). 
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a bankruptcy court holding for the Credit Union.30 After In re Price, debtors in the Third Circuit 
could retain encumbered collateral post-bankruptcy as long as they did not miss a scheduled 
payment. In effect, post-bankruptcy debts became nonrecourse, allowing a creditor to repossess 
but not to recover any repayment deficiency.31 
Following In re Price, the Sixth Circuit rejected common-law ride-through,32 while the 
Eighth Circuit never reached a decision on the issue.33 The resulting five-five circuit split 
continued until the eve of BAPCPA. Not only did the circuit split create geographic inequities 
for debtors and creditors, but it also violated an explicit constitutional mandate directing 
Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”34 Based on problems associated with common-law ride-through, one professor called it 
the “most controversial consumer credit issue arising in cases under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.”35 
B. The BAPCPA Amendments 
In 2005, Congress recodified Bankruptcy Code section 521(2)(A) as section 521(a)(6), 
leaving intact its core provisions. Post-BAPCPA, debtors must file a statement of intention 
                                                 
30 The Third Circuit first found the text of section 521 ambiguous, and so contextualized it among related 
Bankruptcy Code provisions. Price v. Delaware State Police Fed. Credit Union (In re Price), 370 F.3d 362, 368 (3d 
Cir. 2004). Based on extensive “substantive rights” to collateral retention elsewhere in the Code, the court concluded 
that section 521(2) “is not intended to deprive the Prices of broad retention options,” including ride-through. Id. at 
372-74. The Price court also resisted the characterization of ride-through as a “fourth option,” insisting instead that it 
was an ever-present choice for debtors and utterly consistent with bankruptcy policy. Id. at 372-73. Other courts, 
however, have termed it “the fourth option,” an exploitation of a loophole rather than an affirmative statutory right. 
E.g., In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 847. 
31 U.C.C. § 9-615 (2000); Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 719 (“The effect [of 
reaffirmation] is to transform the claim into a nonrecourse debt. The debtor's personal liability has been discharged 
but the lien lives on as a strong incentive to voluntary payment.”). 
32  See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1054-55, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983). 
33  See Sanabria v. Am. Nat’l. Bank (In re Sanabria), 317 B.R. 59, 60-61 & nn.2-3 (8th Cir. 2004). 
34  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
35  Waxman, supra note 27, at 187. 
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declaring whether they will redeem collateral, reaffirm debt, or surrender the asset to the secured 
creditor.36 The BAPCPA amendments did not change the terms of surrender, but raised the cost 
of redemption by requiring a debtor to pay “the price that a retail merchant would charge,” rather 
than liquidation value, to redeem.37 
The BAPCPA amendments also increased the cost of reaffirmation by imposing new 
procedural safeguards. Before BAPCPA, reaffirming debtors and creditors had to comply with a 
statutory checklist, but BAPCPA ramped up the requisite financial disclosures. Post-BAPCPA 
section 524(c) requires a creditor to make specific disclosures to a reaffirming debtor, and 
requires the debtor’s lawyer to file an affidavit certifying that the debtor will not suffer undue 
hardship as a result of the reaffirmation agreement.38 Section 524(a)(6) further requires a court to 
review the agreement if the lawyer refuses to sign the affidavit, if the debtor’s income falls short 
of reaffirmation payments,39 or if the debtor is pro se.40 Courts will reject any reaffirmation 
agreement that “impos[es] an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor” or is 
                                                 
36 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (2010). 
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2010) (allowing a Chapter 7 debtor to redeem “[b]y paying the holder of such lien the 
amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at the time of redemption”); 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2010) (stating that for Chapter 7 debtors, the value of the secured claim on personal property 
“shall be determined based on the replacement value,” defined as “the price a retail merchant would charge for 
property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined.”). The 
BAPCPA amendments codified U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rash, which required replacement value in Chapter 
13 cramdowns, as applicable to Chapter 7 debtors as well. See supra note 17. Prior to BAPCPA, courts were mixed 
on whether Rash applied to Chapter 7 debtors; many continued to require liquidation value to redeem. Id. Although 
in some circuits revised section 722 merely codified existing common law, the net effect of BAPCPA was to “call 
for a higher price for redemption than under case law prior to the [BAPCPA].” Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-
Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 468 (2005) [hereinafter Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux]. 
38 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2010). For a detailed discussion of the new procedural requirements for lawyers, 
debtors, and the court, see also David B. Wheeler & Douglas E. Wedge, A Fully-Informed Decision: Reaffirmation, 
Disclosure, and the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, AM. BANKR. L.J. 789 (2005). 
39  This is particularly important because “many among the debtors’ bar staunchly refuse to endorse a client’s 
reaffirmation efforts.” Wheeler & Wedge, supra note 38, at 804. 
40  11 U.S.C. §§ 524(d), 524(c)(6)(A) (2010). Courts also reviewed reaffirmation agreements filed by pro se 
debtors for undue hardship under the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3) (2000). 
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not “in the best interest of the debtor.”41 The agreement is enforceable only after creditor, debtor, 
and judicial certification. 
Unlike the explicit revisions with respect to redemption and reaffirmation, the BAPCPA 
amendments did not address common-law ride-through. In fact, commentators expressed 
confusion about whether they had any effect on ride-through at all. Shortly after the enactment of 
BAPCPA, an American Bankruptcy Institute online poll reported that thirty-two percent of 
respondents “agreed strongly” that BAPCPA eliminated common-law ride-through, but twenty-
eight percent “strongly disagreed” with the same statement.42 Courts were equally bewildered. A 
bankruptcy court compared deciphering the effect of BAPCPA on ride-through to solving “a 
Rubik’s cube that had arrived with a manufacturer’s defect,”43 and the Ninth Circuit called it 
“hardly the model of a well-drafted statute.”44  
To the muddled text of the BAPCPA amendments, the skeletal legislative record added 
little clarity. In a 2005 article forecasting the effect of BAPCPA on collateral retention in 
Chapters 7 and 13, Professor Braucher noted that “[t]here is no Senate committee report, and the 
House Judiciary Committee report contains only a paraphrase of the provisions addressing ride-
through and valuation.”45 Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee report does not contain the 
phrase “ride-through” at all.46 
                                                 
41 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(d), 524(c)(6)(A) (2010). 
42  Philip R. Principe, Did BAPCPA Eliminate the “Fourth Option” for Individual Debtors' Secured Personal 
Property?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2005, at 6. 
43 In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).  
44  Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2009). 
45  Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 37, at 482 n.13; see also In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 
1111 (noting that, in interpreting the BAPCPA, “legislative history is not an able guide”). 
46  H.R. Rep. No. 109-31 (2005). 
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Still, many believe that Congress intended BAPCPA to eliminate ride-through.47 
Creditors’ representatives heavily influenced the drafting process.48 While the public record does 
not capture Congressional accession to their demands, Professor Whitford has noted that 
eliminating common-law ride-through was “high on the wish lists” of influential creditor interest 
groups.49 If Congress complied with creditor demands – or, as one bankruptcy court suggests, 
employed creditor groups to draft the amendments50 – it is almost certain that BAPCPA meant to 
eliminate common-law ride-through. Still, the messy drafting of BAPCPA gave way to fractured 
opinions on its interpretation,51 and without a clear congressional directive, the fate of ride-
through fell to the courts. 
C. In re Miller: The Death of Ride-Through 
Nearly a decade after In re Price, Kimberly Miller filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition 
in Delaware.52 When Miller filed bankruptcy, Chrysler Financial had a purchase money security 
interest in a Chrysler Town and Country minivan that Miller had purchased from a dealer in 
                                                 
47  E.g., John C. Anderson, Highlights of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and. Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 – Part 1 – Consumer Cases, 33 S.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005) (observing that BAPCPA “requires that the debtor 
reaffirm the debt”). 
48  E.g., Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 37, at 457 (scorning BAPCPA as “a case study 
of what can go wrong when an interest group uses its muscle to pass a complex piece of legislation without a 
careful, expert drafting process.”). 
49  William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 143, 172 (2007). 
50  In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 706 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (“Congress drafted, or allowed to be drafted by 
others and then enacted, provisions with ‘loose’ and imprecise language.”). 
51  Professor Braucher urged courts to interpret the ambiguity favorably for consumers to avoid rewarding 
creditor groups that had dominated the drafting process for their statutory mess. Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through 
Redux, supra note 37, at 458. A Student Note argued that the textual changes pursuant to BAPCPA were sufficiently 
ambiguous that the pre-2005 circuit split should continue. Christopher M. Hogan, Will the Ride-Through Ride 
Again?, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 882, 926 (2008); but see In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112 (“It would raise serious 
constitutional questions for us to conclude that Congress affirmatively intended to promote the non-uniform system 
caused by the circuit split over ride-through.”). 
52 In re Miller, 443 B.R. 54, 55 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). Miller filed her bankruptcy petition on June 30, 2010. 
Id. 
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2006.53 Like the Prices, Miller had obligations under section 521 with respect to the encumbered 
vehicle. But unlike the Prices, Miller filed after the enactment of BAPCPA. 
Kimberly Miller’s Chapter 7 petition placed the perplexing question of post-BAPCPA 
ride-through squarely before the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. Like the Prices, Miller was 
dissatisfied by her options under the Code. She did not want to surrender her vehicle, could not 
afford to redeem, and wished to avoid the renewed personal liability and costs associated with 
reaffirmation. Accordingly, Miller neglected to check either “reaffirm” or “redeem” on her 
section 521 statement of intention.54 Citing In re Price, Miller asserted that because she was up-
to-date on loan payments, she would ride-through the car in bankruptcy.55 
To determine whether BAPCPA eliminated ride-through, the court parsed the 
amendments. New section 521(a)(6) added a single phrase to section 521(2)(A). To the flush 
language of section 521(a) stating that “nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) . . . shall alter the 
debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such property under this title,” section 521(a)(6) 
appended “except as provided in section 362(h).”56 Section 362(h), also new under BAPCPA, 
allowed for the termination of the automatic stay57 
(1) . . . if the debtor fails within the applicable time set by section 
521 (a)(2)— 
(A) to file timely any statement of intention required under 
section 521 (a)(2) with respect to such personal property or 
to indicate in such statement that the debtor will either 
surrender such personal property or retain it and, if 
retaining such personal property, either redeem such 
                                                 
53 Id. at 55. State law rather than the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “purchase money security interest.” 
The Bankruptcy Code treats a purchase money security interest as a special form of secured debt. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 56. 
56  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(*) (2010). 
57  The automatic stay is an injunction against creditor repossession, triggered by filing of a bankruptcy 
petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2010). 
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personal property pursuant to section 722, enter into an 
agreement of the kind specified in section 524 (c) . . . ; and 
(B) to take timely the action specified in such statement . . . 
unless such statement specifies the debtor’s intention to 
reaffirm such debt on the original contract terms and the 
creditor refuses to agree to the reaffirmation on such 
terms.58 
The Miller court reasoned that the amendments to section 521 did not by themselves 
eliminate ride-through. But section 362(h)(1)(A) evidently required surrender, redemption, or 
reaffirmation59 to enforce the automatic stay. Because Miller intended to merely “retain 
collateral and continue to make regular payments,” her election was unsupported by BAPCPA.60 
Rather, the post-BAPCPA Code “requires a debtor to do more than merely stating that she 
intends to continue to make payments on a debt.”61 In re Price was no longer good law, and 
common-law ride-through no longer an option. 
So far, the Miller holding reflects a national consensus, as courts have referenced the 
statutory text and each other to conclude that BAPCPA eliminated common-law ride-through.62 
Post-BAPCPA, only three statutory options remain available to Chapter 7 debtors under section 
521. They must either redeem or surrender the collateral, or reaffirm the secured debt. The 
                                                 
58  11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1) (2010). 
59  Reaffirmation is not plainly listed, but the text refers to an “agreement of the kind specified by section 
524(c).” For further discussion of section 524(c), see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
60 In re Miller, 443 B.R. 54, 58 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
61 Id. at 59. While Chapter 7 debtors could no longer elect to ride-through an asset, the Miller court noted that 
the BAPCPA had “narrowed,” rather than eliminated, the ride-though option. Id. at 58. This language was 
deliberate: in 2008, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court permitted a debtor to ride-through when the debtor had signed a 
valid reaffirmation agreement that was later rejected by the court. See In re Baker, 390 B.R. 524, 532 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2008). This construction, termed “backdoor ride-through,” is discussed further infra Part III(C). 
62  E.g., In re Linderman, 435 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Nationally, debtors no longer can keep 
personal property without reaffirming the debt or redeeming the property. All debtors are treated similarly in every 
circuit.”); see generally Christopher McGowan Badger, Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman: You Can Still 
“Ride-Through” the Eastern District of North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2249, 2255-56 (2010).  
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remainder of this paper considers the insufficiency of post-BAPCPA asset retention options, 
illustrating the advantages of statutory ride-through over the status quo. 
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SECTION 521 
The two seemingly straightforward asset retention options listed in post-BAPCPA section 
521 mask a more complex reality. After examining the role of each asset retention option in 
practice, it becomes apparent that most, and even the vast majority, of secured debt in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy is not reaffirmed, and yet the assets are neither redeemed nor surrendered. In 1997, 
Professors Culhane and White observed that some debtors and creditors were reaching asset 
retention agreements outside of section 521.63 This Part explains that result, employing economic 
analysis and empirical evidence to explain why rational debtors and creditors avoid redemption, 
reaffirmation, and surrender. The framework underpins the analysis of this Note, providing a 
context both to explain debtor-creditor avoidance of section 521 and also to evaluate the merit of 
alternatives. 
A.   The Analytic Framework 
To appreciate the situation of Bowden, Miller, the Prices, and their secured creditors, it is 
necessary to first understand the structural incentives of each. Though each debtor-creditor pair 
shares a stake in the same asset, their subjective valuations of that asset differ. Consider three 
                                                 
63  Culhane and White discovered that although seventy-two percent of debtors indicated that they intended to 
reaffirm their vehicle debt, two-thirds of those reaffirmations were never filed in court. Culhane & White, Debt After 
Discharge, supra note 18, at 739. They then traced motor vehicle records and found “quite a few” still registered to 
non-reaffirming debtors. On this basis, Culhane and White concluded those parties had reached a retention 
agreement outside of court. Id. at 741; see also U.S. Bankr. Ct., Dist. of Ariz., The Honorable Eileen W. Hollowell 
Discusses Reaffirmation, http://www.azb.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?PID=84 (advising Chapter 7 debtors that a 
creditor may say, “We don’t want to bother with [reaffirmation]. Don’t worry; just make your payments. Everything 
with be fine.”) [hereinafter Hon. Hollowell on Reaffirmation].  
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values: VD, VC, and L. VD is the value of the asset to the debtor at the time of filing bankruptcy. 
VC is the value of the same asset to the secured creditor, or its liquidation value.64 L is the loan 
outstanding on the asset when the debtor files the Chapter 7 petition. It will generally be the case 
that VD > L > VC. 
Debtors typically value the asset above the value of the outstanding loan, VD > L, for 
three reasons. First, debtors emerge from Chapter 7 bankruptcy as subprime borrowers who will 
struggle to secure a loan immediately after bankruptcy.65 Whether a dishwasher or car, debtors 
come to rely upon an asset, and the inability to replace the asset disincentivizes surrender.66 
Second, there are transaction costs involved in searching for, obtaining, and in the case of a 
motor vehicle, registering a replacement asset. These costs can be avoided through asset 
retention. Third, psychological literature has shown that individuals exhibit a strong preference 
for assets they already possess.67 Empirical evidence supports the assertion that debtors highly 
                                                 
64  Liquidation value might also be called “salvage value”; it is the price the creditor could obtain upon 
reselling the asset in the market. 
65  Katherine Porter, Life After Debt: Understanding the Credit Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (2010) (describing how few debtors had taken out loans within the year following 
bankruptcy, but three years out the majority had secured new credit). 
66  For many debtors, vehicles are essential for a daily work commute or for transporting family members. See 
Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 383 B.R. 481, 484 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) aff'd, 581 F.3d 1104 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“Debtors usually need a car to travel to and from work, school, medical appointments, and other 
important activities. Having just filed for bankruptcy, they understandably expect to experience difficulty securing 
financing for another vehicle.”). 
67  This phenomenon has been called the “endowment effect” or “status quo bias.” It takes root in a series of 
studies demonstrating that people demand a higher price for product they own than they are willing to pay for the 
same product. E.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Test of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1325, 1342 (1990) (finding a strong and immediate 
endowment effect, expressed as reluctance to trade, among subjects who were randomly awarded certain mugs or 
pens). 
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value collateral: a high percentage of debtors hope to retain collateral after emerging from 
bankruptcy68 and many reaffirm the debt at a higher interest rate.69 
It will also be true that creditors value the asset less than the outstanding loan, L > VC, 
because consumer debts are typically undersecured, or have negative equity.70 Used household 
goods, like washing machines or refrigerators, can be resold only at a fraction of their retail 
value. Motor vehicles depreciate most the moment they are driven from the lot, and yet are paid 
off according to a flat monthly schedule,71 leaving new car lenders undersecured by an average 
of $4,000 at the time a debtor declares bankruptcy.72 While not all consumer debt will adhere to 
this ordinal ranking, this Note assumes VD > L > VC for encumbered assets.  
B. The Impracticality of Surrender, Redemption, and Reaffirmation 
Assuming VD > L > VC, economic analysis and empirical evidence show that rational 
debtors and creditors are likely to avoid each of the three options available under section 521. 
The first option, surrender, creates a social loss. Redemption is attractive but will rarely be 
                                                 
68  Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 739 (finding that seventy-nine percent of 
Chapter 7 debtors intended to retain their encumbered vehicles through bankruptcy); In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1108 
(noting that debtors frequently reaffirm the full value of “underwater” debts). 
69  Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 755-56 (observing double-digit reaffirmation 
interest rates, with one debtor reaffirming unsecured credit card debt at an astonishing sixty percent). 
70  E.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep the Car? Some Thoughts on 
Collateral Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 471, 472 (2002) (“Consumer 
creditors are frequently undersecured.”) [hereinafter Culhane & White, Thoughts on Collateral Retention]. A 
creditor is undersecured when the outstanding debt is greater than the fair market value of the asset.  
71  In the automobile industry, this is sometimes referred to as “drive-off depreciation.” Prior to the enactment 
of the BAPCPA, an automobile creditor representative testified before the House Judiciary Committee that 
“[secured vehicle lenders] suffer the greatest losses . . . in the early years of the vehicles [sic] life when depreciation 
is the greatest.” William C. Whitfod, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of the BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 143, 178 (2007) (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and 
Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and 
H.R. 3146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., pt. 
3, at 88 (1998)). See also In re Robson, 369 B.R. 377, 382 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Generally, vehicles depreciate 
the most when they are newest . . .”).  
72  See supra note 21. 
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feasible. Reaffirmation, finally, is laden with transaction costs and subject to judicial rejection. 
More often than not, none of the three options will yield a satisfactory equilibrium outcome. 
i. Surrender: The White Flag of Deadweight Loss 
Debtors value collateral at VD, an amount greater than the outstanding loan. Creditors, on 
the other hand, value the asset only at its resale value, VC.73 By transferring collateral from the 
debtor to creditor, surrender imposes a deadweight loss of VD – VC, causing economic distortion 
by forcing a transfer of an asset from a high-value to low-value user.74 Moreover, because VD > 
L, a debtor will not voluntarily surrender an asset; and because L > VC, a creditor would prefer 
continuing to collect payments to repossessing the asset. Surrender represents a bargaining 
failure, obtained only if all other statutory options fail. 
ii. Redemption: They Would if They Could 
Redemption is almost always infeasible for debtors in practice. To redeem encumbered 
collateral, a debtor must have sufficient cash to pay the full amount of outstanding lien. Because 
debtors in bankruptcy are liquidity-constrained, they are generally unable to redeem collateral.75 
                                                 
73  The creditor retains an unsecured claim for VC – L, but will collect only a minute fraction of that amount. 
After resale, the creditor retains an unsecured claim for the deficiency, to be asserted against other unsecured 
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2010). Such claims are virtually worthless, as unsecured 
creditors collect just a few cents on the dollar in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
74 The same argument applies to repossession, which is a functionally equivalent creditor remedy. Professor 
Schwartz notes that “[r]epossession ‘destroys value’ because individual debtors commonly value goods in excess of 
their market prices but repossessing creditors at best resell at these prices. Because repossession imposes greater 
harms on debtors than it gains for creditors, it actually minimizes social welfare.” Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability 
of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & ECON. 117, 119 (1983); see also Culhane & White, Thoughts on 
Collateral Retention, supra note 70, at 474 (“[R]etention of collateral by Chapter 7 debtors ought to be facilitated, 
but only where retention will further the fresh start and yield creditors more than liquidation value.”). 
75  E.g., In re Price, 370 F.3d at 376 (noting that “chapter 7 debtors . . . are, by definition, insolvent and 
unlikely to possess the funds to buy their secured property outright”); Hon. Hollowell on Reaffirmation, supra note 
63 (advising debtors that “sometimes [redemption] is an option; rarely, though, because usually it’s more money 
than you’re going to have”). 
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Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that debtors are rarely in a position to 
redeem. In 1997, Professors Culhane and White found that although seventy-nine percent of 
Chapter 7 debtors intended to retain their encumbered asset through bankruptcy, only four 
percent of debtors hoped to do so by redeeming.76 This is significant because redemption offers a 
relatively inexpensive method of collateral retention, requiring only retail value as opposed to the 
full outstanding debt.77 Before BAPCPA, if debtors could afford to redeem collateral, they 
almost certainly would; yet they did not. 
Following the BAPCPA amendments, it is even less likely that a debtor would redeem, 
because BAPCPA raised the cost of redemption. At the time of the Culhane and White study, 
debtors in many districts could redeem collateral by paying liquidation value, VC.78 The post-
BAPCPA Code requires retail value to redeem, so the percentage of redeeming debtors should be 
even lower than the four percent observed by Culhane and White.79 In sum, redemption is 
preferred by debtors, but only in the rare circumstance in which it is available.  
iii. Reaffirmation: Transaction Costs and Uncertainty 
Following the constructive repeal of common-law ride-through, reaffirmation is the 
single statutory alternative to redemption for post-bankruptcy collateral retention. On its face, it 
                                                 
76  Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 739. 
77  Redeeming debtors pay only retail value for the collateral. See supra note 37. To reaffirm or ride-through 
debt, a debtor must pay the entire outstanding loan. See supra note 37.  
78  See supra note 17. Because a debtor typically values an asset at above liquidation value, redemption was 
attractive. See Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 601 (2000). 
79  Given the attractiveness of redemption and its infeasibility for the average consumer debtor, scholars have 
argued that courts should permit redemption by installments. Culhane & White, Thoughts on Collateral Retention, 
supra note 70, at 492-93 (citing Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means-Testing as a 
Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Report as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 1, 23 (1998); William Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989)). So far, 
however, the idea lacks legislative and judicial traction. 
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is an attractive option. Reaffirmation agreements typically require a debtor to reaffirm L. 
Because VD > L > VC, in theory, debtors and creditors should each get a surplus from entering a 
reaffirmation agreement as compared to surrendering the asset.80 Yet like redemption, 
reaffirmation is rare in practice, for two reasons. 
First, uncertainty about judicial approval may deter debtors and creditors from 
reaffirming debt. Reaffirmation agreements frequently do not succeed in court, either because 
they fail the section 524(c)(6) requirement of being in the debtor’s best interests,81 or because the 
parties withdraw the agreement before judicial review.82 In 2010, a total of 359,972 reaffirmation 
agreements were filed, but only 2,801 – less than two percent – of the cases had reaffirmation 
agreements approved.83 Particularly under BAPCPA’s more stringent reaffirmation requirements, 
filing an agreement does not ensure that debt will be reaffirmed. 
Second, reaffirmation agreements are costly, so even if they were strictly enforceable, 
debtors and creditors might avoid entering one. Professor Scott Ehrlich points out that the cost of 
complying with the reaffirmation checklist – including the requisite disclosures, income 
                                                 
80  See Adler et al, supra note 78, at 601 (making this argument). 
81  The BAPCPA requires courts to reject a reaffirmation agreement upon finding that the agreement either 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor’s dependents, or is not in the debtor’s best interest. See 
11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A) (2010). 
82  See discussion infra Part II(C)(ii). 
83  U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS, REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS WITH 
PREDOMINANTLY NONBUSINESS DEBTS 2010, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (follow 
“Calendar Year 2010” hyperlink under “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act Statistics”; 
then follow “Table 4” hyperlink). The number of reaffirmation agreements filed in the United States has steadily 
risen in the past several years, from 113,634 agreements filed in 2007 to more than triple that number in 2010. U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS, REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS WITH PREDOMINANTLY 
NONBUSINESS DEBTS 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (follow “Calendar (follow 
“Calendar Year 2007” hyperlink under “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act Statistics”; 
then follow “Table 4” hyperlink). 
The report does not distinguish between reaffirmations of secured and unsecured debt, and many of the 
rejected agreements may have involved unsecured debt. Because more than half of consumer debt is secured, 
however, it is likely that at a significant portion of the reaffirmation agreements involved secured debt. See supra 
note 7. It is also unclear what percent of the ninety-eight missing reaffirmations were rejected in court. Some may 
have been withdrawn before judicial review. See discussion infra Part II(C)(ii). 
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schedules, and affidavits84 – typically ranges from “a few hundred to several thousand dollars for 
each agreement.”85 This financial burden may outweigh any surplus obtained through 
reaffirmation. In that case, rational debtors and creditors will elect to negotiate outside of court. 
From the statutory options emerges a conundrum. Most debtors cannot afford to redeem, 
and debtors and creditors jointly avoid surrender. Under section 521, the only other option is 
reaffirmation. Yet in 2010, only a small fraction of all Chapter 7 bankruptcies resulted in court-
sanctioned reaffirmation agreements. Evidently, the vast majority of the secured debt in Chapter 
7 bankruptcy is treated outside of section 521. 
III. EXTRA-STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES 
Because Chapter 7 debtors and creditors rationally avoid all three post-BAPCPA asset 
retention options, alternatives have emerged to fill the void. This Part considers options that exist 
outside of section 521. Before BAPCPA, debtors might convert to Chapter 13, and creditors 
might forbear on their right to repossess collateral, leading to a de facto ride-through 
arrangement. Following BAPCPA, these two options remain available, along with an emerging 
third, backdoor ride-through. A comprehensive understanding of asset retention options provides 
a backdrop for meaningful normative analysis.  
                                                 
84  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c); see also discussion supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
For a sample reaffirmation form, see U.S. CTS. BANKR. COMMITTEE, REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT COVER 
SHEET, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Forms/BankruptcyForms.aspx (follow “B 27” 
hyperlink under “Part I - Official Forms, Instructions, and Committee Notes”). 
85  Scott B. Ehrlich, The Fourth Option of Section 521(2)(a) – Reaffirmation Agreements and the Chapter 7 
Consumer Debtor, 53 MERCER L. REV. 613, 616 (2002). 
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A.   Pre-BAPCPA: Chapter 13 and Forbearance 
Professor Ehrlich argued that eliminating common-law ride-through would ultimately 
prove disastrous to creditors because reaffirmation imposed significant transaction costs on all 
parties to the bankruptcy proceeding.86 Yet less than five years after his article was published, 
creditors returned to Congress to lobby in favor of reaffirmation.87 Though Professor Ehrlich’s 
analysis was robust, his doomsday forecast failed because he overlooked the alternatives that 
existed outside of the Code. In reality, prior to BAPCPA, a debtor might avoid section 521 
entirely by converting to Chapter 13. Even more likely, a creditor who wished to avoid the 
transaction costs associated with reaffirmation might simply agree to forbear on repossession 
rights so long as the debtor made regular payments. It is likely that these extrastatutory options 
dominated the section 521 options before BAPCPA; and post-BAPCPA, they have likely 
become even more common. As Professor Ehrlich’s failed prediction reveals, these options are 
essential to understand the incentives faced by debtors and creditors in practice. 
i. Conversion to Chapter 13 
At first glance, converting to Chapter 13 bankruptcy seems an attractive option for 
debtors who are dissatisfied with the Chapter 7 retention options. Whereas Chapter 7 allows 
individual filers to discharge unsecured debts in exchange for forfeiting assets, Chapter 13 allows 
a debtor to retain assets in exchange for paying a portion of future income to creditors.88 
                                                 
86  Ehrlich, supra note 85, at 696 (admonishing creditors to “[b]e careful what you ask for, you just may get 
it”). 
87  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
88  Within fifteen days of filing a bankruptcy petition, a Chapter 13 debtor must propose a creditor repayment 
plan, under which the debtor commits a portion of future income to satisfying creditor claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 
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Consumer debtors may elect to file either Chapter 7 or 13 petitions, and a debtor who files a 
Chapter 7 petition may later convert to Chapter 13.89 
The disappearance of common-law ride-through left debtors to choose between the less 
attractive asset retention options under section 521. In theory, then, more debtors should file or 
convert to Chapter 13 petitions following BAPCPA. But the empirical evidence on this point is 
inconclusive. Before BAPCPA, a student Note observed a loose correlation between circuits 
allowing common-law ride-through and Chapter 13 filings,90 but an empirical study declared a 
similar hypothesis “unfounded.”91 Rather, it seems likely that other considerations outweigh 
asset retention in the choice to file either a Chapter 7 or 13 petition.92 
Following the BAPCPA amendments, it is even less likely that Chapter 7 debtors would 
convert to Chapter 13, because BAPCPA also raised the price of Chapter 13 collateral retention 
as part of a plan to deter abusive filers.93 Before BAPCPA, all secured claims on consumer assets 
were bifurcated in bankruptcy.94 Bifurcation divided claims into a secured portion for the value 
                                                                                                                                                             
1333 (2010). To be approved, a Chapter 13 plan must award creditors at least as much as they would have received 
in Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2010). 
89  See 11 U.S.C. § 706(a). 
90  Hogan, supra note 51, at 909. 
91  Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 726 (“Districts with both a right to ride-through 
and a high Chapter 13 percentage would, we thought, have the lowest reaffirmation rates of all. Now that the facts 
are in, it is clear that our Chapter 13 theory was unfounded . . . [T]here is no correlation, direct or inverse, between 
Chapter 13 and reaffirmation rates within our districts.”). 
92  For example, filers who are lured by the fresh start offered by Chapter 7 may be reluctant to agree to a 
payment plan awarding their future income to creditors. 
93  The BAPCPA attempted to curb abusive bankruptcy filings by raising the cost of collateral retention in 
Chapter 13, and then pushing high-income Chapter 7 debtors into Chapter 13. To target abusive filers, BAPCPA 
revised section 707(b) to implement a means test, which denied Chapter 7 relief to debtors who either acted in bad 
faith or had sufficient income to repay debts. The BAPCPA requires debtors who fail the means test to file petitions 
under Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010). For a general discussion of the application of the means test and its 
effect for individual filers, see generally Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 231, 231 (2005). For a discussion of its history, see generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).  
94  11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000). 
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of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.95 Because creditors collect little of 
their unsecured claims,96 bifurcation ultimately reduced debtor repayment. The post-BAPCPA 
Code no longer bifurcates the claims of secured creditors if the asset was acquired within the 
previous year, or if the secured asset is a car that was purchased within the 910 days before 
bankruptcy.97 Instead, the entire loan is treated as secured debt and full repayment is required.98 
By requiring full repayment for certain types of collateral, BAPCPA makes Chapter 13 a 
less desirable means of asset retention. If evidence on the correlation between Chapter 13 filings 
and the existence of common-law ride-through was mixed before BAPCPA, after BAPCPA 
conversion is even less likely.99 In fact, Professor Braucher predicts the converse effect: “[W]ith 
higher repayment requirements for some collateral in chapter 13, many debtors who would have 
filed in chapter 13 before will now file in chapter 7.”100 
ii. Forbearance Agreements and Other Out-of-Court Bargains 
Rather than file a reaffirmation agreement, debtors and creditors may enter a repayment 
agreement outside of court. In so doing, they avoid the cost of filing a reaffirmation agreement, 
                                                 
95  Id. 
96  See supra note 73. 
97  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*) (2010). 
98  Id. 
99  Professor Adler and colleagues analyzed the payoff to debtors and creditors of converting from Chapter 7 
to Chapter 13 under the pre-BAPCPA Code. They demonstrated that a debtor would only convert to Chapter 13 
when the present value of payments to creditors in Chapter 13 is less than VD –  (VD – VC), where  represents the 
debtor’s bargaining power in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Adler et al, supra note 78, at 605-6. Using this equation, 
Professor Adler concluded that debtors would prefer Chapter 13 in four situations: when their Chapter 13 payments 
are small; VD, the value to the debtor, is large; , the debtor’s bargaining power in Chapter 7, is small; and (VD – VC), 
the total surplus between debtor and creditor value, is small. Id. at 606. The BAPCPA amendments did not affect VD 
or VC, but the on the right-hand side of the equation, but increased the required payments to creditors. The Adler 
model thus supports the conclusion that fewer Chapter 7 debtors would convert to Chapter 13 following the 
BAPCPA. Author’s note: As published, the article adds rather than subtracts VD and  (VD – VC). The typographical 
error has been corrected here. 
100  Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 37, at 459 n.9. For further discussion of the failure of 
debtors to complete Chapter 13, see infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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along with the risk of judicial rejection. Two forms of out-of-court bargains exist. The first, 
“rogue reaffirmations,” are illegal reaffirmation agreements obtained when creditors approach 
debtors directly to reaffirm, rather than filing with the court as required by section 524. Despite 
their unenforceability, rogue reaffirmations were once popular, comprising one-half of all 
reaffirmation agreements.101 During the 1990s, their prevalence was curbed by a series of class 
action lawsuits that resulted in sizable sanctions against major retailers.102 Rogue reaffirmations 
have generated no major litigation since that time, and although data is unavailable, it is likely 
that their frequency has subsided. 
Alternatively, and more commonly, creditors may simply forbear on repossession rights. 
A forbearing creditor agrees not to repossess collateral as long the debtor continues making 
regular loan payments, leading to a form of voluntary ride-through. Forbearance agreements are 
particularly likely in two circumstances. First, if a creditor suspects that a court might reject the 
reaffirmation agreement on the basis of undue hardship, and the resale value of the collateral 
(VC) is low, the creditor might acquiesce with the expectation that a few monthly payments will 
be worth more than repossession. Alternatively, a creditor might believe that a fresh-start debtor 
                                                 
101  1 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 163 (2d ed. 
1997). For further discussion, see Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 717. The investigation 
revealed ugly facts. To evince rogue reaffirmations from debtors, creditors used everything from “offers of post-
bankruptcy credit” to “deceptive threats of repossession.” Culhane & White, Thoughts on Collateral Retention, 
supra note 70, at 483. Not only did unsuspecting debtors believe the agreements were binding, but because rogue 
reaffirmations look identical to valid agreements, even courts had to check records to ascertain validity. 
102  During the 1990s, the Commission responded to repeated allegations against major retailers by conducting 
a thorough investigation, which resulted in numerous lawsuits and hefty settlements. Sears, for example, settled a 
class action related to rogue reaffirmations for $320 million. See In re Melendez, 224 B.R. 252, 261-64 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1998). Within two years, similar class actions were brought against General Motors and Circuit City, and a 
coalition of state attorneys general brought suit against Federated Department Stores. See Ehrlich, supra note 85, at 
628-29.  
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will ride-through the asset to full repayment.103 In that case, the personal liability secured by 
reaffirmation is worthless, and the agreement presents needless transaction costs. 
Before BAPCPA, Professors Culhane and White provided some evidence that out-of-
court bargaining – either in the form of rogue reaffirmations or forbearance agreements – did in 
fact occur.104 Out-of-court bargaining likely occurs more frequently in the post-BAPCPA world. 
By making the section 521 collateral retention options less feasible, BAPCPA increased the 
incentives of both debtors and creditors to reach other methods of retention in order to avoid 
surrender.105 If the 1990s litigation effectively deterred rogue reaffirmations, that out-of-court 
bargaining is likely to take the form of forbearance agreements. 
B. Post-BAPCPA: Backdoor Ride-Through 
Since BAPCPA, backdoor ride-through has emerged as a new form of asset retention. 
Compared with forbearance agreement, which occurs in lieu of judicial proceedings, and 
common-law ride-through, which allowed a debtor in five circuits to elect ride-through 
treatment, backdoor ride-through is an ex post remedy applied by courts. To qualify for backdoor 
ride-through, a debtor must comply with the requirements of section 524,106 including filing a 
                                                 
103  Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 37, at 476 (noting that a Chapter 7 debt discharge 
helps debtors pay secured debts, and “this gain in creditworthiness may more than offset the creditor’s loss of 
recourse against the debtor personally after discharge.”). This also helps explain why reaffirmation agreements 
frequently exceed a debtor’s ability to pay. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text. Creditors pursue 
reaffirmation in lieu of ride-through when continued personal liability adds value; in other words, when the debtor 
will likely fail to repay. 
104  Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 739-41. 
105  For further discussion, see Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 37, at 462-63 (predicting 
that eliminating ride-through across all jurisdictions would lead to an increase in voluntary ride-through among 
creditors). 
106  11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(2), 521(a)(6), 362(h) (2010). 
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reaffirmation agreement. Then, if the court rejects the agreement,107 the court may instead allow 
the debtor to ride-through the asset. This opens a limited ride-through option for debtors whom 
the court believes will be unduly burdened by a reaffirmation agreement, and is recognized in a 
growing number of jurisdictions. 
The North Carolina case Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman is illustrative.108 
When Landon and Daffney Hardiman filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the couple had an outstanding 
loan of more than $20,000 on a Chevrolet Equinox with fair market value of $9,000. The couple 
entered a reaffirmation agreement with Coastal, their lender.109 Based on pre-petition income and 
expenses, the court observed that the Hardimans would run a monthly deficit of more than 
$1,000 after making reaffirmation payments.110 Yet the Hardimans insisted they could comply 
with the reaffirmation terms. They admitted that “it would be hard sometimes,” but relied upon 
their Chevrolet to transport their three children and refused to surrender.111 
The court ultimately found that the agreement imposed undue hardship and could not be 
accepted. Nonetheless, the court allowed the Hardimans to retain their vehicle. Because the 
Hardimans had attempted to reaffirm, the court reasoned, they met the burden of sections 
521(a)(1) and 362(h), which required entering a reaffirmation agreement.112 Although the 
reaffirmation agreement was rejected, the automatic stay continued under section 362, so the 
                                                 
107  A court will reject a reaffirmation agreement upon finding that it imposes an undue burden or is against the 
debtor’s best interests. See supra note 41.  
108  Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 165 (E.D.N.C. 2008); see also generally Badger, 
supra note 62 (discussing the facts of the case, and arguing that the Hardiman holding should be nationally adopted 
because it is consistent with the BAPCPA and consumer bankruptcy policy). 
109  Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 166. 
110  The bankruptcy court expressed concern with discrepancies between the pre-payment income asserted by 
the Hardimans in their initial Chapter 7 application and in the filed reaffirmation agreement. Id. 
111 Id. 
112  11 U.S.C. § 524(c). 
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Hardimans were able to backdoor ride-through their vehicle. Coastal appealed, protesting that the 
result reached by the court was absurd and out of line with Congressional intent.113 The 
Hardiman court rejected both arguments,114 and so far, other courts have ruled likewise.115   
C. The Big Picture: Asset Retention after BAPCPA 
An examination of debtor and creditor incentives, in tandem with empirical evidence, 
suggests that a vast amount of secured debt in Chapter 7 bankruptcy is channeled outside of 
section 521. Debtors may convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, though few debtors will take 
advantage of this statutory option after BAPCPA. Debtors and creditors may also achieve 
resolution outside of court, typically in the form of a forbearance agreement. Finally, if debtors 
and creditors agree to unsustainable reaffirmation terms, courts may convert a rejected 
reaffirmation agreement into backdoor ride-through. While empirical evidence on the options 
outside 521 options is thin, it is likely that they dominate the statutory options in practice. Even 
before BAPCPA, debtors and creditors avoided surrender, redemption, and reaffirmation. As the 
attractiveness of statutory asset retention options suffers under the BAPCPA amendments, the 
avenues outside of 521 will attract more traffic. 
In sum, by creating a dearth of feasible asset retention options by statute, BAPCPA 
incentivized debtors and creditors to seek recourse outside of the Bankruptcy Code. The next 
                                                 
113  Id. at 167. Cf. Hogan, supra note 51, at 918 (“This backdoor ride-through could be accused of bordering on 
judicial activism, or at least operating contrary to congressional intent.”). 
114  The court found “plausible reasons” Congress might have mandated this outcome and no clear expression 
of contrary legislative intent. Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 179. 
115  E.g., In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007) (“Having entered into the reaffirmation 
agreement 13 days after the first meeting of creditors, Debtor fully complied with the requirement under § 521(a)(6), 
and the remedy found under § 521(a)(6) in inapplicable to this Debtor.”); In re Baker, 390 B.R. 524, 532 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2008), aff'd, 400 B.R. 136 (D. Del. 2009) (“[B]ecause the Debtors timely entered into a reaffirmation 
agreement (regardless of whether the agreement was approved by the Court) they may retain their vehicle while 
staying current on their loan payments”). 
 29 
Part illuminates the policy problems associated with Chapter 7 asset retention following 
BAPCPA, while the following Part illustrates why the post-BAPCPA developments have 
strengthened policy arguments in favor of statutory ride-through.  
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STATUS QUO 
Consumer bankruptcy policy has three goals: to protect creditors’ interests, give debtors a 
fresh start,116 and promote national uniformity of law.117 The post-BAPCPA Code falls short 
with respect to each objective. Part A shows how the system fails to guarantee a fresh start to 
debtors. Part B illustrates how the BAPCPA amendments may press unforeseen risks on secured 
creditors – an observation with both theoretical and political implications. Finally, Part C 
illustrates the irregularity and uncertainty with which the current law is applied. 
A.     A Disservice to Debtors 
Both reaffirmation and the options outside section 521 are misaligned with the fresh start 
policy and a debtor’s general economic interests. Scholars have long argued against 
reaffirmation as a violation of the fresh start policy. Moreover, as this section demonstrates, the 
options that have developed outside section 521 are no more helpful to Chapter 7 debtors. 
                                                 
116  See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (“It is the twofold purpose of the bankruptcy act 
to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors, and then to give the bankrupt a fresh 
start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched.”). 
117  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
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i. The General Case Against Reaffirmation 
Chapter 7 protects the paradigmatic honest debtor by allowing individuals to file a 
petition and claim a fresh start.118 Yet the fresh start policy is more than a moral guidepost. It 
also prevents the development of an insolvent underclass, incentivizes creditors to monitor 
debtors, and protects creditors by allowing them to discharge failed loans.119 It has been 
repeatedly observed by bankruptcy scholars, courts, and policymakers that reaffirmation 
agreements violate the fresh start policy, because they renew personal liability for pre-
bankruptcy debts following the Chapter 7 discharge.120 
Reaffirmation agreements are also problematic in economic terms. Reaffirming secured 
debt gives rise to a social surplus of VD – VC, and so could theoretically benefit both debtors and 
creditors.121 But under the current Code, the majority of reaffirmation surplus goes to creditors. 
Barry Adler and his colleagues demonstrate that if bargaining power were shared, a debtor and 
                                                 
118  H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 125 (stating that the purpose of Chapter 7 is for debtors to “obtain a fresh start, 
free from creditor harassment and free from the worries and pressures of too much debt”). 
119  Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395 n.5 (1985). 
At 1426 (“Discharge . . . heightens creditors’ incentives to monitor: by providing for a right of discharge, society 
enlists creditors in the effort to oversee the individual's credit decisions even when the individual has not fully 
mortgaged his future.”); Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical 
Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 57 (1986) (identifying as reasons for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy “a perception of insolvent debtors as potentially valuable contributors to the nation's economic 
development, whose participation in the economy was impeded by the hopelessness of their financial conditions,” as 
well as a secondary argument rooted in “social utility” and a lack of blameworthiness); Eric A. Posner, Should 
Debtors Be Forced into Chapter 13?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 969 (1999) (“The bankruptcy law is motivated in 
part by the fear that tough loan-forgiveness laws would produce a class of people who would be continually 
dependent on social welfare programs.”). 
120  E.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 163 (“To the extent reaffirmations are enforceable, the ‘fresh start’ goal of 
the discharge provisions is frustrated.”); In re Wilhelm, 369 B.R. 882, 883 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007) (“Reaffirmation 
agreements are . . . contrary to one of the primary goals of the Bankruptcy Code: to provide a debtor with a fresh 
start.”); Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 765 (“Reaffirmation . . . too often it burdens and 
impedes [the fresh start].”). 
121  See supra Part II(B)(iii). 
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creditor would each benefit from entering a reaffirmation agreement.122 If the debtor has no 
bargaining power, however, the debtor is made worse off by reaffirming.123 The latter case is 
arguably closer to reality due to two underlying inequities. First, creditors are better able to 
handle delays in the negotiation process.124 Second, creditors have less to lose if the parties 
cannot agree to a reaffirmation agreement.125 Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee observed 
that the “unequal bargaining position of debtors and creditors, and the creditors’ superior 
experience in bankruptcy matters” leads to an overabundance of reaffirmations.126 
Furthermore, Chapter 7 debtors frequently agree to reaffirmation terms they cannot hope 
to satisfy.127 Despite the procedural safeguards of section 524(a)(6), one empirical study found 
that among reaffirming debtors, “[f]ewer than half . . . had any income remaining after expenses 
and reaffirmation payments, and only a third had more than $100 per month left.”128 This is 
particularly problematic because if debtors default on reaffirmation payments, they are worse off 
                                                 
122  Adler et al, supra note 78, at 601. 
123  Id. at 604 (“[W]hen the creditor has market power ex ante and bargaining power ex post, the borrower, who 
is likely a relatively poor person, not only realizes little ex post surplus but also faces a higher interest rate”).   
124  A debtor must comply with the section 521 timeline to propose a reaffirmation agreement. See U.S.C. § 
521(a)(1)-(2). A creditor who refuses to negotiate may repossess the asset after 45 days and resell for liquidation 
value. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(*). For a discussion of bargaining power in two-party agreements, see JOEL WATSON, 
STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 216-222 (2nd ed. 2008). 
125  Upon surrender, the creditor loses VC – L, and the debtor loses L – VD. See supra Part II(B)(i). It may not 
always be the case that debtors suffer a greater loss as a result of failed reaffirmation, but the creditor’s loss is 
monetary where the debtor loses a literally irreplaceable asset. See supra note 66. 
126  H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 163; see also Ehrlich, supra note 85, at 616-17 (noting that creditors occupy “an 
unfair bargaining position where they can demand fees and changes in payment terms as a condition to agree to the 
reaffirmation”). 
127  Bankruptcy Judge Mary Diehl explains the realities of Chapter 7 reaffirmation agreements for 
unrepresented debtors: “[Creditors] say, ‘We know you really want to keep this car, so just sign here, and you can 
keep paying this car at 27% interest . . .’ The debtor will sign this without ever undertaking the analysis of whether 
they can afford it . . .” The Honorable Mary Grace Diehl et al., The Consumer Bankruptcy Panel: Views from the 
Bench – Five Years of BAPCPA, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 225, 239-40 (2010). See also Culhane & White, 
Thoughts on Collateral Retention, supra note 70, at 479-80 (“Experience under the Act of 1898 showed that . . . 
debtors all too often reaffirmed beyond their ability to repay . . . ”); Adler et al, supra note 78, at 601 (“Debtors are 
said often to make foolish reaffirmation bargains, in which they give up too much for what they get.”). 
128  Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 759. 
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than if they had simply surrendered. They both lose the underlying asset and face continued 
liability for any repayment deficiency, which they may be unable to discharge because the Code 
limits repeat bankruptcy filings.129 From a debtor’s perspective, reaffirmation is riddled with 
pitfalls, so it is no surprise that reaffirmation agreements are “largely creditor-driven.”130 
ii. The Trouble with the Alternatives 
The asset retention options available outside section 521, while an improvement over 
reaffirmation, equally fail to protect debtor’s interests. First, Chapter 13 is inconsistent with the 
policy goals underlying Chapter 7.131 Rather than a fresh start, Chapter 13 offers asset retention 
in exchange for garnishing wages, which by definition impairs post-bankruptcy earning power. 
Moreover, as with reaffirmation agreements, debtors frequently agree to Chapter 13 repayment 
plans they cannot maintain.132 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the “vast majority” of 
Chapter 13 plans fail.133 
                                                 
129 See Badger, supra note 62, at 2266 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006)). 
130 1 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 101, at 146. In the past, creditors have 
“aggressively pursued debtors for reaffirmations.” Culhane & White, Thoughts on Collateral Retention, supra note 
70, at 479-80. To secure reaffirmation agreements, creditors have even resorted to “misleading information or 
threats.” Ehrlich, supra note 85, at 625. Under creditor pressure, debtors in circuits that allowed ride-through prior to 
BAPCPA regularly reaffirmed debts. See Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 18, at 726 (finding an 
inverse relationship between the ride-through option and reaffirmation agreements, but noting that a significant 
number of debtors in ride-through districts nonetheless reaffirmed). This runs counter to economic rationality. See 
supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
131 E.g., Posner, supra note 119, at 969 (arguing that the means test, which targets abusive Chapter 7 filers by 
pushing them into Chapter 13, “would defeat a purpose of bankruptcy law”). For further discussion of the means 
test, see supra note 93.  
132 Estimates of debtor default on Chapter 13 repayment plans rate range from approximately two-thirds, see 
Scott Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in 
Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 415, 440 (1999) (finding a 68% failure rate), to 97% in certain districts, see 
William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and 
Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 397, 410 (1994). 
In 2010, “the majority of the chapter 13 cases closed were dismissed, not closed due to plan completion.” 
BANKRUPTCY REPORT 2010, supra note 7, at 14. In total, only 14 percent of debtors who closed their Chapter 13 
cases in 2010 successfully completed their repayment plans – up from 6 percent in 2009. Id. at 16. 
133 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 693 (1997). 
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Creditor forbearance, on the other hand, protects the fresh start. Because forbearance 
agreements are nonrecourse, if a debtor fails to make a scheduled repayment following 
bankruptcy, a secured creditor may repossess the asset and nothing further. But forbearance 
agreements create other problems. Creditors will voluntarily forbear only when it suits their own 
interests, requiring only the riskiest debtors to reaffirm debt. Moreover, secured creditors are 
repeat players in consumer bankruptcy proceedings, so they are familiar with the nonstatutory 
options. Experienced counsel may also some debtors of the options outside section 521. Pro se or 
poorly advised debtors, however, will proceed unaware of non-statutory alternatives, which 
aggravates bargaining inequities. 
Finally, backdoor ride-through could prove helpful to debtors, because it keeps loans 
nonrecourse after bankruptcy, but it is applied too unpredictably to confer benefit on Chapter 7 
debtors as a class. If backdoor ride-through were to become commonplace, it might have an 
additional pro-debtor effect of discouraging creditors from pressing unduly exacting 
reaffirmation terms.134 So far, however, the irregularity with which courts apply backdoor ride-
through135 and its uncertain status in many jurisdictions136 will likely curtail any deterrent effect. 
In sum, despite its “Consumer Protection” title, BAPCPA failed to improve the position of 
Chapter 7 debtors. 
                                                 
134  Backdoor ride-through is detrimental to creditors for the reasons discussed infra Part III(B). 
135  Because backdoor ride-through requires a finding of undue hardship under the terms of a reaffirmation 
agreement, only poorer debtors who appear before attentive judges may access it. 
136  See infra Part III(C). 
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B.     Backdoor Ride-Through and Creditor Risk 
The interest in protecting creditors’ interests serves as an important policy counterweight 
to the fresh start. Secured lending is integral to the U.S. economy, and Congress accordingly 
extends generous protection to secured creditors.137 Outside of bankruptcy, creditors have the 
right to repossess secured collateral and retain the proceeds on sale, guaranteeing them at least 
liquidation value.138 In bankruptcy, secured creditors likewise receive at least the value of their 
nonbankruptcy claims and potentially much more. Redemption and reaffirmation agreements, for 
example, actually improve the position of secured creditors over a nonbankruptcy state, by 
allowing a creditor to collect a portion of the deficiency in addition to the asset value.139 These 
interests are both theoretical and practical, because well-funded lobbyists represent creditors’ 
interests in Congress, with impactful results. 
If secured debt is designed for creditor protection, backdoor ride-through represents a 
likely unintended departure from Congressional goals. Rather than protect creditors, backdoor 
ride-through exposes them to their riskiest debtors, enforcing a binding nonrecourse debt 
agreement after bankruptcy. Three variables illustrate the source of potential creditor loss. A0 is 
the value of the asset at the time of bankruptcy. AR is the asset value at the time of repossession. 
                                                 
137  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1111 (“Because of the importance of secured lending to the nation’s economy, 
secured creditors have been the subject of particular congressional solicitude.”). 
138  Outside of bankruptcy, following default, a secured creditor has the right to repossess the collateral 
securing the loan. See U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(1) (2000). The repossession remedy affords a creditor the right to enter the 
debtor’s premises, repossess the collateral, and dispose of the collateral in a “commercially reasonable” method. 
U.C.C. § 9-610; U.C.C. § 9-627 (defining “commercially reasonable”). When a consumer files Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, however, an “automatic stay” is triggered, which prevents creditors from reclaiming assets. 11 U.S.C. § 
362 (2010). 
139  A creditor collects retail value of collateral from redemption, liquidation value from surrender, and the 
value lien value when a debtor reaffirms. See supra Part II(B)(i)-(iii). The Code further stipulates that if a debtor 
fails to comply with section 521 notice requirements, a creditor is entitled to take whatever action as to such 
property [] is permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(*). 
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P represents the total payments on collateral received by the debtor between time bankruptcy and 
repossession. A creditor could be made worse off by ride-through only if A0 – AR > P, or if the 
post-petition reduction in asset value due to depreciation and damage outweighs the offsetting 
payments received during the same time period. 
In lobbying against common-law ride-through, creditors protested that their interests 
would not be adequately protected if consumers could retain an asset without renewing personal 
liability. Without liability for reduced collateral value, they argued, a debtor had no incentive to 
maintain the value of the collateral between bankruptcy and later default.140 The debtor might 
intentionally damage the asset, sabotaging creditor collection. Alternatively, the asset might 
depreciate too quickly for the loss of value to be offset by incoming payments. Either way, A0 – 
AR > P, so the creditor would suffer a loss. 
In general, it is unlikely that a ride-through debtor would damage assets post-
bankruptcy.141 But a creditor would face the greatest concern when the expected payment P is 
low, as when default is expected after few payments. Likewise, if the expected damage or 
depreciation, A0 – AR, is high, a creditor might prefer to repossess rather than risk further value 
impairment. This situation characterizes backdoor ride-through. In order to qualify for backdoor 
ride-through, a court must find undue hardship, meaning the debtor has relatively low income 
compared to required payments. In that case, the value of incoming payments P is small, and 
from a creditor’s perspective, the debtor is likely to default. Further, if the debtor knows that 
long-term asset retention is unlikely, the debtor has reduced incentive to maintain the collateral, 
                                                 
140  1 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 101, at 167 (noting that creditors “wanted 
debtors to have an incentive to take care of the collateral and felt that personal liability provided that incentive.”). In 
economic terms, this distortion of incentives is called the “moral hazard” problem. 
141  See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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so the expected damage and depreciation A0 – AR will be large. Finally, by continuing the 
automatic stay, backdoor ride-through creates a binding nonrecourse retention remedy, limiting 
post-bankruptcy repossession rights beyond those available with common-law ride-through. 
In sum, by granting debtors who are least able to pay a continued right to retain collateral 
without renewing personal liability, backdoor ride-through both exposes creditors to their riskiest 
pool of consumer debtors, and introduces a gambling aspect to reaffirmation agreements. This 
Note will return to both of these drawbacks to back-door ride through in Part IV(C)(ii), 
emphasizing the advantages of statutory over backdoor ride-through from a creditors’ 
perspective.  
C. The Jurisdictional Patchwork of Backdoor Ride-Through 
As the dust settles, BAPCPA seems to have resolved the five-five circuit split by 
extinguishing common-law ride-through. But pulling the strings to patch one area of the 
bankruptcy net has created another gap. One by one, courts that reject reaffirmation agreements 
must consider whether the debtor may take advantage of backdoor ride-through. 
The new puzzle has not created a circuit split, but adds unpredictability and irregularity to 
the treatment of secured debt in Chapter 7 proceedings, which in turn frustrates the constitutional 
mandate to create uniform bankruptcy laws.142 Most bankruptcy courts that have reached the 
issue have allowed backdoor ride-through,143 but many have not yet ruled on the issue.144 Some 
                                                 
142  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
143  In December 2011, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied a creditor motion for 
rehearing after the court had allowed a debtor to backdoor ride-through. In re Reed, No. 10-67727, 2011 WL 
6328677, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2011). In its analysis, the court first cited seven post-BAPCPA opinions 
endorsing backdoor ride-through. Id. at *3. The court further reasoned that “[s]ince Congress didn't remove ‘if 
applicable’ with passage of BAPCPA even though this language was heavily relied upon by courts to justify ride-
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courts, including the Ninth Circuit, specifically reserved the question.145 Other courts impose 
additional preconditions to backdoor ride-through. At least one bankruptcy court expressed 
reluctance to allow backdoor ride-through if the debtor’s lawyer has refused to sign the 
reaffirmation agreement,146 and the Hardiman court suggested that a creditor could obtain relief 
from backdoor ride-through by showing “cause” under section 362(d).147 
Finally, even in districts where backdoor ride-through is firmly established, it is difficult 
to predict to whom the new rule will apply. The process for evaluating reaffirmation agreements 
under BAPCPA is not uniform.148 Because backdoor ride-through arises from rejected 
reaffirmation agreement, it cannot hope to be either. 
V. THE POST-BAPCPA CASE FOR STATUTORY RIDE-THROUGH 
In the wake of BAPCPA, the consumer bankruptcy system has become a labyrinth of 
inequity, failing to protect both debtors and creditors and thwarting national uniformity. This 
Part advocates modifying section 521 to replace reaffirmation with statutory ride-through, adding 
a reinstate-and-cure provision for debtors who have fallen behind on payments. It first describes 
the proposed reform and its anticipated impact. It then discusses the enhanced policy merit of 
statutory ride-through following BAPCPA. In particular, while ride-through has been urged as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
through provisions, such congressional inaction, while not dispositive, suggests a lack of intention to eliminate the 
ride-through option espoused by many courts.” Id. at *4. 
144  This is due partly to a recurrent problem of mootness. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
145  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112 (acknowledging that the decision “leaves the law of ride-through unclear, 
creating uncertainty for many Chapter 7 debtors and creditors alike”) (citations omitted). 
146  In re Harvey, 452 B.R. 179, 186-87 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2010) (reasoning that allowing backdoor ride-
through in this case would create “a very powerful incentive to debtors and their counsel not to make the hard 
choices themselves but to try and put them before the court”). 
147  Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 183. 
148  See Lisa A. Napoli, Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259, 271-74 (2007) (describing how the BAPCPA 
amendments to section 524 resulted in “non-uniform procedures for the evaluation of reaffirmation agreements”). 
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pro-debtor policy, this Part describes how it would also benefit creditors as compared to 
backdoor ride-through. Finally, it considers the ex ante impact of backdoor ride-through, arguing 
that it should not adversely affect the interest rates and availability of loans to subprime 
borrowers. 
A.       Blueprint for Reform 
Codifying backdoor ride-through would require little textual revision, modifying only the 
options available for secured collateral under section 521. Under proposed section 521, a debtor 
who is current on payments may elect one of three options for treatment of secured collateral: 
surrender, redemption, or ride-through.149 Section 362(h), specifying that a debtor is limited to 
the section 521 options, is removed from the Code.150 
The redemption and surrender options exist as under BAPCPA.151 Statutory ride-through, 
unlike common-law ride-through prior to BAPCPA, applies in all circuits and incorporates a 
reinstate-and-cure provision akin to the one in Chapter 13.152 Under the reinstate-and-cure 
provision, a debtor who has fallen behind on payments prior to filing a Chapter 7 petition may 
cure any default “within a reasonable time” of the bankruptcy filing.153 After electing ride-
through, the debtor continues to make payments according to the original loan schedule. If a 
                                                 
149  Compared to current section 521, the proposed text replaces reaffirmation with ride-through. See text 
accompanying supra note 15.  
150  By endorsing ride-through, the dominant option outside section 521, the revision voids the need for the 
specific limiting provision of BAPCPA. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.  
151  There are compelling arguments for reducing the cost of redemption to VC, or liquidation value, as it was 
before BAPCPA in many circuits. See supra note 17. Allowing secured creditors to collect retail value enables them 
to collect both the secured and a portion of the unsecured claim in bankruptcy. Thus when a debtor redeems, secured 
creditors take some of the funds otherwise payable to unsecured creditors. This Note supports the position that 
liquidation value would better effectuate the maxim that “equity delights in equality,” but focuses primarily on ride-
through rather than the cost of redemption as a corrective policy measure. 
152  See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). 
153  Id. 
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ride-through debtor commits an act of default after emerging from bankruptcy, the creditor may 
repossess the asset but may not assert a claim against the debtor for the deficiency. 
The proposed revisions modify debtor and creditor incentives as well as the equilibrium 
outcome. Assuming VD > L > VC,154 debtors and creditors will continue to avoid surrender, and 
redemption will be largely infeasible.155 Thus both debtors and creditors will prefer ride-through, 
much as it seemed they would prefer reaffirmation under the post-BAPCPA Code.156 When ride-
through replaces reaffirmation, however, debtors and creditors have less reason to seek out extra-
statutory options. Debtors and creditors avoid reaffirmation because it costly and uncertain,157 
and instead reach out-of-court arrangements, including rogue reaffirmations and forbearance 
agreements. The proposed statute disincentivizes both extra-statutory options. Creditors would 
no longer press rogue reaffirmations because reaffirmation agreements would be strictly 
unenforceable, and would no longer forbear because an equivalent remedy is a statutory recourse 
for debtors. For the same reason, courts would no longer apply backdoor ride-through.158 Finally, 
debtors could still convert to Chapter 13, but an expanded right to collateral retention in Chapter 
7 makes conversion even less likely than under BAPCPA. 
In sum, the major shortcomings of the current system are extinguished by replacing 
reaffirmation with ride-through. By making the formal options for asset retention more attractive, 
the proposed Code incentivizes outcomes within the legal boundaries of Chapter 7. The next Part 
shows how statutory ride-through protects the interests of debtors and creditors as well. 
                                                 
154 See supra Part II(A). 
155 See supra Part II(Error! Reference source not found.)(ii). 
156  See supra Part II(B)(iii).  
157  Id. 
158  Backdoor ride-through requires both a reaffirmation agreement and finding of undue hardship. See supra 
Part III(C). Without reaffirmation, there is no backdoor ride-through. 
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B. Justifying Ride-Through in a Post-BAPCPA World 
The asset retention mess left by BAPCPA would be adequately swept aside by statutory 
ride-through. Measuring statutory ride-through against the three bankruptcy policy objectives – 
ensuring a fresh start, protecting creditors, and promoting uniformity – statutory ride-through 
outperforms the status quo with respect to all three. 
Scholars, judges, and policymakers have long recognized statutory ride-through as a pro-
debtor policy.159 A ride-through debtor simply continues pre-petition loan payments, and is 
bound only by the original contract. This cures the fresh start problems associated with 
reaffirmation, and also saves the cost of negotiating and filing a reaffirmation agreement.160 
Following BAPCPA, the pro-debtor arguments have increased salience. A debtor who reaffirms 
under current law is uncertain whether that agreement will yield reaffirmation, a forbearance 
agreement, or backdoor ride-through. By allowing debtors to elect ride-through, the proposed 
statutory options eliminate the need to seek recourse outside the Bankruptcy Code.161 Instead, the 
revised text promises both simplification and increased transparency by telling debtors exactly 
what their options are. 
Although ride-through has generally been framed as a pro-debtor policy, there is a 
compelling argument that – particularly after BAPCPA – it might be framed as a pro-creditor 
policy as well. As Professor Ehrlich noted prior to BAPCPA, not only will statutory ride-through 
almost always yield liquidation value VC to secured creditors, but in most cases will allow them 
                                                 
159  In 2002, Professor Ehrlich published a thorough analysis of the pre-BAPCPA status of ride-through, 
arguing that ride-through, or the “Notification Interpretation,” should be more widely adopted. See generally 
Ehrlich, supra note 85. Among other arguments, Professor Ehrlich pointed out that the ride-through voids the need 
for reaffirmations, and so better implements the fresh start policy of Chapter 7. Id. at 667. 
160  See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
161  See discussion supra Section V(Error! Reference source not found.). 
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to collect the outstanding loan L, putting them in the same place as if the debtor had 
reaffirmed.162 This section examines more closely the reasons secured creditors have argued 
against statutory ride-through, and shows why the post-BAPCPA developments in asset retention 
– and in particular, backdoor ride-through – present good reasons for pro-creditor Congress to 
consider adopting statutory ride-through. 
There are three reasons to believe that statutory ride-through protects creditors’ interests. 
First, even if a ride-through debtor does not wholly repay the outstanding loan, a creditor will 
generally obtain VC, her nonbankruptcy outcome. As discussed in Part III(Error! Reference 
source not found.), as long as the pre-petition payment schedule offsets depreciation and 
damage, a creditor will be no worse off repossessing after post-bankruptcy default.163 By electing 
to ride-through the asset rather than simply surrender, a debtor signals a strong interest in 
retaining the collateral and so has little incentive to damage or destroy it. For this reason, the 
Third Circuit called the fear that debtors would intentionally damage ride-through assets 
“overstated and entirely hypothetical.”164  
Second, in the majority of cases, debtors who elect ride-through complete all outstanding 
loan payments, so creditors collect L. Two observations support this proposition. Very few 
                                                 
162  Reaffirming debt allows a creditor to re-secure debt up to L, the value of the lien. Ride-through, on the 
other hand, allows the creditor to capture VC plus regular payments made by the debtor following bankruptcy. If the 
debtor completes all payments, the creditor will receive L, the amount of the original lien. 
Similarly, edemption and surrender continue to guarantee secured creditors at least the value of their non-
bankruptcy claim, VC. To redeem, a debtor must pay retail value, which gives the creditor more than VC. See supra 
note 37. A secured creditor collects her lowest payoff, liquidation value VC, when the debtor surrenders the asset. 
See text accompanying supra note 73.  
163  See discussion supra Part III(A). 
164  In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 377 (3d Cir. 2004). Instead, the court reasoned, “[i]t is just as reasonable to 
assume, given the difficulty insolvent consumers may have in obtaining future financing, that such debtors would 
have ample incentive to maintain their collateral, such as their automobiles, in good condition.” Id. Professor Ehrlich 
further develops this argument, pointing out that a debtor with equity in the collateral has strong incentives to 
maintain its value, and that the personal liability that accompanies reaffirmation agreements is unlikely to improve 
the debtors’ incentives in any case. Ehrlich, supra note 85, at 655-56. 
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Chapter 7 cases result in enforceable reaffirmation agreements. In 2010, only a fraction of a 
percentage of Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions included approved reaffirmation agreements.165 
Instead, as Culhane and White demonstrate, many creditors agree to forbear even when 
reaffirmation is available.166 The fact that creditors regularly bypass renewed personal liability 
suggests that ride-through and reaffirmation are relatively equivalent.167 A recurrent problem of 
mootness in ride-through cases further buttresses the assertion that most debtors successfully 
ride-through assets: many circuits have not yet considered whether BAPCPA eliminated ride-
through because the original parties no longer have standing on appeal. Consumer debt is repaid 
over a short loan term, and by the time the case reaches an appellate court debtors have typically 
repaid the outstanding loan.168  
Third, and most importantly, a creditor may in any case alter the terms of the initial 
lending contract to address concerns that a debtor might damage ride-through assets. Many 
lending contracts contain “insecurity clauses” that allow a creditor to repossess if the asset value 
is threatened. For high-value collateral, particularly vehicles, creditors might further specify that 
                                                 
165  Out of 1,129,955 Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions, there were only 2,801 approved reaffirmation 
agreements. See supra notes 7, 83. 
166  See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
167  When a debtor successfully rides-through, a creditor would prefer ride-through to reaffirmation because it 
eliminates the costs associated with negotiating and filing a reaffirmation agreement. See Ehrlich, supra note 85, at 
697 (“The cost to the creditor of processing the reaffirmation agreement and the nominal increase in value received 
by establishing the debtor’s post-discharge personal liability rarely justify the effort.”). See also supra note 85. 
168  This circumstance occurs so frequently that parties have argued that ride-through should fall under an 
exception to the mootness doctrine for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See, e.g., In re Price, 370 
F. 3d at 365 (considering arguments by both the Prices and Credit Union that ride-through should be heard under the 
“capable of repetition” exception to mootness, even though the Prices paid the full outstanding loan before the case 
reached the Third Circuit). Creditors have argued a mootness exception in order to continue litigation against a 
fully-paid debtor. E.g., Reply Br. At 6, BankBoston, N.A., v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534 
(2d. Cir. 2000) (Nos. 99-5048, 99-5054). Although they stand nothing to gain against the debtor-litigant, creditors 
still wish to retain reaffirmation rights, which allow them to press reaffirmation agreements when personal liability 
would add value, and otherwise simply forbear on repossession rights. 
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failing to maintain submit regular proof of insurance constitutes an act of default.169 In this way, 
creditors may ensure that the value of the collateral is protected post-bankruptcy, while shifting 
the monitoring costs to the debtor. In either case, a creditor may then repossess immediately 
following debtor default, virtually guaranteeing that the creditor would collect VC in any case.170 
From a practical perspective, comparing statutory ride-through to backdoor ride-through 
gives post-BAPCPA Congress reason to consider adopting the statutory version. As discussed in 
Part III(B), backdoor ride-through under BAPCPA presents a serious dilemma for secured 
creditors by introducing a gambling aspect to reaffirmation agreements. Backdoor ride-through 
continues the automatic stay under section 362, and so enforces a binding nonrecourse debt 
agreement. Statutory ride-through, on the other hand, terminates the automatic stay but allows 
the debtor to retain collateral. Because the terms of statutory ride-through adhere to the original 
lending agreement, creditors shape the terms of default and repossession. It is almost certain that 
the creditors’ groups who shaped the BAPCPA amendments did not intend to allow backdoor 
ride-through, and its emergence gives ever more reason to adopt statutory ride-through in its 
place. 
In sum, under proposed section 521, surrender and redemption yield the same payoffs as 
under the post-BAPCPA Code, and ride-through will generally be equivalent to reaffirmation 
from a creditor’s perspective. In any case, through ex ante contracting, creditors may ensure that 
they collect at least VC, their non-bankruptcy payoff, and so their interests are adequately 
                                                 
169  “Default” is not defined by the U.C.C., but rather by the terms of the lending agreement. 
170  See supra note 140 and accompanying text. If a debtor must maintain insurance or surrender, a debtor 
cannot destroy collateral and prevent the creditor from collecting VC. Moreover, if the debtor bears the burden of 
proving insurance, the creditor need not incur the transaction costs of monitoring the debtor. 
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protected. Given the drawbacks associated with backdoor ride-through, creditor-friendly 
Congress has more reason than ever to consider statutory ride-through as a viable option. 
Finally, as to the third goal of bankruptcy policy, statutory ride-through enhances 
uniformity by unambiguously resolving the pre-BAPCPA circuit split on common-law ride-
through. It further resolves two points of judicial confusion related to interpreting reaffirmation 
agreements under BAPCPA: whether backdoor ride-through should be imposed, and how undue 
hardship should be measured.171  
C. Effect on Terms of Subprime Lending 
Market analysis assumes that creditors who expect lower payment in bankruptcy will 
charge a higher ex ante interest rate.172 On this basis, the Eleventh Circuit once worried that 
eliminating reaffirmation agreements would have the secondary effect of raising interest rates on 
consumer debt.173 This section first challenges the basis for that assertion, and then argues that 
any small effect on credit rates due to replacing reaffirmation with ride-through would in any 
case reflect a shift into a fairer equilibrium. 
As a threshold matter, it is unclear that the increased risk would translate into higher 
interest rates. First, consumer credit markets imperfectly account for risk.174 In addition, most 
states impose interest rate caps on loans to subprime borrowers. The respondent’s brief in Till v. 
SCS Credit Corp. provides a list of states with interest rate caps, compared with those with rates 
                                                 
171  See discussion supra Part III(C). 
172  An ex ante perspective shifts the focus from Chapter 7 debtors and creditors to third parties who have not 
filed bankruptcy petitions. Cf. Adler et al, supra note 78, at 586-87 (advocating for and applying an ex ante approach 
to considering efficiency in consumer bankruptcy). 
173  In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516. 
174  See generally Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 
(2008) (discussing systemic mistakes that permeate the consumer credit market). 
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set freely by contract.175 When the brief was filed in 2003, sixteen states had a flat interest rate 
cap on consumer loans, and thirteen had some other form of cap.176 When high-risk consumers 
take out loans in those jurisdictions, secured creditors already charge the maximum interest rate. 
In that case, the increased risk would likely translate into decreased availability of high-risk 
loans, rather than higher credit rates, in many jurisdictions. 
 Yet because ride-through and reaffirmation are relatively equivalent from a creditors’ 
perspective, the proposed revision should not adversely affect the availability of secured credit to 
risky consumers, either. The only loss to a creditor under the proposed system occurs in the 
narrow set of high-risk cases in which creditors would have benefited from personal liability 
through a reaffirmation agreement. In those cases, the creditor must accept a nonrecourse ride-
through arrangement. The magnitude of that loss should be minimal, for the reasons described in 
Part IV(C)(ii): reaffirmation agreements infrequently succeed, creditors may protect themselves 
through altering ex ante contract terms, and backdoor ride-through already exposes creditors to a 
similar risk.177 
Finally, there is a compelling normative argument that any change in lending practices 
under the revised Code would represent a shift into a fairer equilibrium, because the proposed 
changes better align the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy states of affair. Outside of bankruptcy, 
creditors have the right to repossess an asset, but debtors may discharge a repayment deficiency 
                                                 
175  Brief for Respondent at 3, Till v. SCS Credit Corp, 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (No. 02-1016), 2003 WL 
22466039, at *17-19. 
176  Id. 
177  Compare this outcome to bifurcation, as in Chapter 13, which required the debtor to reaffirm only the value 
of the underlying collateral. In that case, creditors are limited to collect VC in all cases, whereas statutory ride-
through generally results in a repayment closer to L. It is no surprise the bifurcation proposal was “[p]erhaps the 
biggest concern of the automobile financing interests.” Whitford, supra note 49, at 172. 
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through a bankruptcy filing.178 With statutory ride-through, then, a secured creditor “is no more 
vulnerable than any lender under a consumer installment sales contract.”179 In comparison, 
reaffirmation allows creditors to renew personal liability for the full value of the asset – both 
secured and unsecured portions of the loan – effectively allowing secured the creditor to profit 
from the debtor’s bankruptcy petition. If replacing reaffirmation with statutory ride-through 
caused interest rates to increase, the shift would reflect the elimination of a subsidy to subprime 
borrowers under the current Code.180 
CONCLUSION 
In 1977, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission advocated ride-through as a 
replacement for reaffirmation, but then abandoned its position.181 Despite compelling arguments 
favoring statutory ride-through as a pro-debtor policy, Congress has never been swayed to 
implement it. This Note shows that following BAPCPA, there is more reason than ever to 
support statutory ride-through. Not only have the pro-debtor arguments strengthened, but the 
post-BAPCPA Code has evolved in a way that secured creditors – and Congress – almost 
certainly did not intend. By creating a holistic picture of post-BAPCPA asset retention and 
measuring each outcome in a simple valuation framework, this Note shows how Chapter 7 
                                                 
178  Supra note 20. 
179  In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348-49 (reasoning that “[a] purchaser who cannot satisfy a deficiency judgment 
can generally file a bankruptcy petition and obtain a discharge. This is a risk the creditor takes on any installment 
loan.”). 
180  We could, for example, mandate that the government recompense secured lenders up to the value of their 
loan, which would have the effect of drastically lowering interest rates to risky credit classes. In general, bankruptcy 
law requires only adequate protection of secured creditors’ interests, and allows the market to dictate lending rates 
that appropriately reflect risk. Allowing reaffirmation is in tension with that policy. 
181  In a 1977 report, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended a “complete ban on 
reaffirmations” and explicit recognition of ride-through. 1 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra 
note 101, at 166. After entertaining concerns from interested parties, the Commission revised its recommendation to 
endorse “limited reaffirmation rights for certain secured debts.” Id. If limited reaffirmation rights were available, the 
Commission reasoned, the Code need not “provide an independent right to retain property.” Id. 
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bankruptcy has developed in a way that frustrates the fresh start, exposes creditors to unforeseen 
risks, and evolves through disordered, idiosyncratic judicial interpretation.182 
Compared with the fractured post-BAPCPA outcome, statutory ride-through would 
protect debtors by ensuring a fresh start, simplifying the available options, and lowering the price 
of collateral retention. More importantly, protects creditors by allowing them to potentially 
collect both secured and unsecured portions of their loan, while eliminating the downsides of 
backdoor ride-through. Finally, by making ride-through a statutory option, the proposed Code 
implements a uniform, predictable treatment of secured debt under section 521 for the first time 
in decades. The text of section 521 affects billions of dollars of secured debt and hundreds of 
thousands of Americans each year. Codifying statutory ride-through would ensure a more 
equitable and efficient treatment of that debt. 
                                                 
182  Cf. Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 37, at 482 (hoping that “[w]hen Congress again 
turns its attention to the Bankruptcy Code . . . it will have learned the lesson that personal bankruptcy law needs to 
be simplified to have predictable and sensible consequences”). 
